Shared Secret Key Authentication And Encryption

This page collects background and original design references for Shared-Secret Key (SSK) security. For current setup instructions, see Lustre Kerberos SSK Authentication and the Configuring Shared-Secret Key (SSK) Security chapter of the Lustre Operations Manual.

Introduction

Shared Key, added in Lustre 2.9 (LU-3289), offers:

• Isolation (all SSK flavors)
  • Prevents clients from mounting without the shared key
  • Binds a key to a nodemap, so it is accepted only from that nodemap's NID ranges (with UID/GID Mapping)

• Message Integrity (ska, ski, skpi)
  • Prevents man-in-the-middle attacks
  • Ensures RPCs cannot be altered without detection. ska covers only non-bulk RPCs; ski and skpi also cover bulk data.

• Privacy (skpi only)
  • Prevents eavesdropping
  • Encrypts RPCs and bulk data

• Ability to choose security flavors between OSS, MDS, MGS, and client nodes, as site policy dictates

Resources

• IU Shared Secret Key authentication and encryption (LU-3289)
• The original OpenSFS Contract SFS-DEV-002 design documents (Shared Key Scope, Architecture, High Level Design, RPC Diagram, and Kerberos Setup Guide) were previously hosted on wiki.opensfs.org but are no longer available online.
• For current setup instructions, see Lustre Kerberos SSK Authentication. For the reference, see the Configuring Shared-Secret Key (SSK) Security chapter of the Lustre Operations Manual.

Presentations

• Securing Lustre with Nodemap and Shared Key (Lustre Ecosystem 2016)
• Using UID Mapping in Lustre 2.7 and GSS Shared Key Update (LUG 2015)